As Time Goes By:  New Questions About the Statute of Limitations for Rule 10b-5 by Fisch, Jill E.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 61 Issue 6 Article 5 
1993 
As Time Goes By: New Questions About the Statute of Limitations 
for Rule 10b-5 
Jill E. Fisch 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jill E. Fisch, As Time Goes By: New Questions About the Statute of Limitations for Rule 10b-5, 61 
Fordham L. Rev. S101 (1993). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol61/iss6/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
As Time Goes By: New Questions About the Statute of Limitations for Rule 10b-5 
Cover Page Footnote 
I am grateful to Marc Arkin and Michael Malloy for their comments on earlier drafts and to Jackie Snider, 
Fordham Law School Class of 1993, for her research assistance. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol61/iss6/5 
AS TIME GOES BY:* NEW QUESTIONS ABOUT
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR
RULE 10b-5
JILL E. FISCH"
In this Article. Professor Fisch examines the history and legacy of Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilberston, the controversial 1991 Supreme Court
decision that established a federal statute of limitations for private causes of ac-
tion brought under Rule 10b-5. In Part I Professor Fisch reviews the history of
the 10b-5 statute of limitations prior to LampE Part II then analyzes both the
issues resolved and questions raised by Lampf. Part III traces the congressional
reaction to Lampf that culminated in the addition of section 27A to the Securities
Act of 1934. In Part IV, Professor Fisch concludes by analyzing the legitimacy of
section 27A and the many issues left unanswered by this statutory response to
Lampf.
~'RE are dozens of Supreme Court decisions and perhaps
thousands of lower court opinions addressing problems of statutory
interpretation that arise in connection with private rights of action under
section 10(b)1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") and
Rule lOb-5 2 of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). The
quantity of judicial ink addressed to the problem is not surprising consid-
ering that, although courts have implied a private right of action, neither
the 1934 Act nor Rule lOb-5 expressly provides such a claim. Accord-
ingly, there is an absence of legislative guidance as to the appropriate
parameters of the cause of action. Unlike most statutory claims in which
Congress delineates the nature of the claim, those who have standing to
pursue it, the proper measure of damages, and the period during which
claims must be filed, in the case of federal securities fraud, these ques-
tions must be answered by the courts.
The courts claim, as of course they must, that providing these answers
does not amount to lawmaking. They explain that they are simply divin-
ing congressional intent. The acknowledged "awkward task" of "imag-
ining" congressional intent with respect to "a cause of action it really
* Along with marking 50 years of Rule lOb-5, we are also celebrating 50 years of
the film classic Casablanca. See Aljcan Harmetz,... And His Movie for All Seasons,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1992, § H, at 11 (reporting that Casablanca opened in New York
on Thanksgiving, 1942).
** Copyright 1993 by Jill E. Fisch. Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University
School of Law. B.A., Cornell University, 1982; J.D., Yale Law School, 1985.
This Article was prepared for a lecture presented on April 1, 1993, at the Fordham
University School of Law Graduate Colloquium "Happy Birthday lOb-5: 50 Years of
Antifraud Regulation." I am grateful to Marc Arkin and Michael Malloy for their com-
ments on earlier drafts and to Jackie Snider, Fordham Law School Class of 1993, for her
research assistance.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
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never knew existed"3 has created a number of judicial principles with
respect to securities fraud that have little origin in the text or history of
the statute.4
The recent struggle to determine the appropriate statute of limitations
under Rule lOb-5 is an example of this process. On June 20, 1991, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Lampf, Peva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson,' in which it held for the first time that claims under Rule lOb-
5 were subject to a uniform federal statute of limitations.6 Six months
after Lampf, Congress responded to the decision with its first legislation
addressed to private civil securities fraud claims.7 The response was an
amendment to the 1934 Act that, although it did not change the Lampf
statute of limitations, precluded its application to pending litigation.'
Although the Court's adoption of a uniform federal statute of limita-
tions after forty years of lower court practice to the contrary smacks of
judicial legislation, the Lampf decision was a welcome end to the uncer-
tainty and forum-shopping created by the prior practice of borrowing
from state law. Moreover the ensuing congressional reaction to the deci-
sion presents an unusual separation of powers question: does a statute
that reverses the retroactive application of a new judicially created stat-
ute of limitations infringe upon the province of the courts? Was the con-
gressional response to Lampf a reclaiming of the legislative function or a
usurpation of the judicial role of statutory interpretation?
The most critical question remains to be answered: what is the future
of the statute of limitations for private claims brought under Rule lOb-5?
Congress intends to consider the issue further, and legislation has been
3. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2780
(1991).
4. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign
Tender Offers, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 523, 547-49 (1993) (discussing judicial efforts to con-
struct hypothetical congressional intent as to extraterritorial application of § 10(b) of the
1934 Act); Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 385 (1990) (criticizing courts for interpreting § 10(b) with-
out due regard for the legislative history).
5. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
6. See id. at 2781. The Court further concluded that the federal limitations period
was one year from the date plaintiff discovered the fraud but, in no event, more than
three years from the date of the fraud and that the new limitations period should be
applied retroactively. See id. at 2782.
7. The only prior congressional action in this area was limited to private claims
relating to insider trading. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988) (providing private civil remedy for those who trade con-
temporaneously with an insider); Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(2) (1988) (imposing civil remedies for insider trading on non-trading tippers).
The theoretical basis and required elements of insider trading liability have also been
developed by the courts rather than Congress. See Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An
Analysis and Proposalfor Insider Trading Regulation, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 179 (1991) (describ-
ing development of insider trading regulation).
8. That amendment, included as part of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991, is discussed in detail in the text accompanying notes 100-52,
infra.
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introduced to expand the limitations period in future cases. If the mess
generated by this first statute is any indication, we should be wary of
future congressional forays into securities fraud legislation.
I. HISTORY OF THE lOb-5 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
For nearly four decades, courts struggled with the issue of determining
the applicable statute of limitations for lOb-5 claims. In the absence of
an express statute of limitations for private federal securities fraud
claims, courts followed the rules applicable to other federal claims in
which there was no express federal period; they "borrowed" the statute
of limitations from the most closely analogous state law9 cause of
action. 10
Borrowing from state law was not as straightforward as it might ap-
pear. First, there was the question of which state cause of action was
most closely analogous to federal securities fraud."1 While some circuits
chose to borrow from state securities laws or blue sky laws, others looked
to the statute of limitations applicable to common law fraud or misrepre-
sentation. 2 Courts then had to determine whether they should borrow
equitable provisions to toll the statute of limitations, such as discovery
periods, equitable tolling doctrines, or delayed accrual due to fraudulent
9. The first appellate court decision to borrow a state law limitations period for a
Rule lOb-5 cause of action was Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1951).
10. Courts had concluded that this approach was dictated by the Rules of Decision
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988), which provides that "[t]he laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of
the United States, in cases where they apply." See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, I I I S. Ct. 2773, 2784 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. Borrowing from state law presented an additional problem in that state law limi-
tations periods were frequently amended. See Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d
1385, 1388-89 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied, III S. Ct. 2887 (1991) (describing difficulty of
borrowing a period for a claim that accrued in 1977 but was litigated after the 1985
amendment of ilinois' statute of limitations in its blue sky law); see also In re Sioux, Ltd.,
Securities Litigation, 914 F.2d 61, 64 (5th Cir. 1990) (reversing dismissal of claims as
time-barred after Texas amended its statute of limitations for common law fraud from
two years to four years).
12. See Short, 908 F.2d at 1388 ("Some [courts] borrow from the statute generally
applicable to fraud; some borrow from state blue sky laws; some courts use a little of each
.... "). These were not the only state law sources used. Some courts borrowed from
state personal injury law. See Maggio v. Gerard Freezer & Ice Co., 824 F.2d 123, 127
(Ist Cir. 1987). Others applied the limitations period provided by general catchall provi-
sions. See Holmes v. Bateson, 434 F. Supp. 1365, 1379 (D.RI. 1977), modified, 583 F.2d
542 (Ist Cir. 1978); see also Ceres Partners v. Gel Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 354-55 (2d Cir.
1990) (citing cases taking borrowing from common law fraud, blue sky laws, personal
injury, and general catchall statutes of limitations); Lyman Johnson, Securities Fraud and
the Mirage of Repose, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 607, 608-09 n.2 (1992) (citing cases borrowing
from blue sky laws versus common law fraud); Thomas Stewart, Note, One Statute. One
Statute of Limitations; At Last Uniformity for Section 10(b) Claims, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev.
533, 557 n. 197 (1991) (same).
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concealment."3 The adoption of these doctrines in some circuits gave
rise, in turn, to further questions: for example, if the statute does not
begin to run until discovery, is it activated when plaintiff knows of the
claim or when plaintiff should have known? 4
Furthermore, since the answer to these questions varied from state to
state, courts had to undertake a choice-of-law analysis to determine both
which circuit's legal doctrine and which state's limitations law to apply. 5
Because federal securities fraud, by definition, requires that the transac-
tion at issue involve interstate commerce, courts could arguably apply at
least two state statutes to any claim. In securities fraud class actions, this
meant that courts could conceivably be called upon to apply dozens of
different limitations periods in a single lawsuit. 6
The variety of answers to these questions meant that both the statute
of limitations for federal securities fraud and the manner in which it was
applied differed from state to state and from case to case. This gave
plaintiffs an unparalleled ability to forum shop. This was particularly
true because of the liberal venue provisions of the federal securities laws
coupled with the national character of many securities transactions. A
securities fraud class action based on transactions in stock listed on a
national exchange, for example, could generally be brought in virtually
any state.17
13. See Short, 908 F.2d at 1387 (describing circuit's practice of adding to the bor-
rowed limitations period "an overlay of tolling principles from state and federal law").
For a detailed examination of the principles of equitable tolling and fraudulent conceal-
ment as applied to federal securities fraud, see Johnson, supra note 12.
14. Courts generally agreed that questions about the application of the statute of limi-
tations were governed by federal law so that, for example, federal law governed applica-
tion of the discovery rule. See, e.g., Corwin v. Marney, Orton Investments, 843 F.2d 194,
198 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988):
Although the federal securities laws borrow statutes of limitations from state
law, federal law determines when the limitations periods begin to run. It is
federal law that imposes the discovery rule, and thus federal law should deter-
mine what circumstances and information should alert the suspicions of a rea-
sonably diligent investor.
(citations omitted).
15. This combination resulted in the application of varied limitations periods for se-
curities fraud even within a single circuit, depending on the state law applicable to any
particular claim. Thus, for example, the First Circuit had applied two, three, and six year
limitations periods in recent cases, depending on whether it was borrowing from the
Maine two-year statute of limitations, the Massachusetts three-year statute, or the Rhode
Island six-year statute. See Ceres Partners, 918 F.2d 349, 354-55 (describing varied limi-
tations periods applied in First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits).
16. See, e.g., Kronfeld v. Advest, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1449, 1457-58 & n.21 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (applying 26 separate limitations periods); In re National Student Marketing Liti-
gation, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 97,926 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 1981) (addressing issues
raised by potential application of limitations periods of more than 34 different
jurisdictions).
17. The plaintiff's ability to choose a forum state required courts frequently to address
a choice of law question as well. Because of the broad jurisdiction and venue provisions
of the federal securities laws, courts then faced the additional question of whether the
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Dissatisfaction" with the logistics of borrowing securities fraud limita-
tions periods from state law did not directly cause the courts to recon-
sider the practice. Rather, the validity of the borrowing approach was
called into question by a series of Supreme Court decisions outside the
securities area holding that, in appropriate cases, it was preferable to look
to federal law as the source of limitations period when the federal statute
in question was silent.
In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 9 the Su-
preme Court was called upon to determine the statute of limitations for
two claims filed by employees under a federal labor statute that con-
tained no statute of limitations provision. The employees' claims had
been dismissed by lower courts that had borrowed the limitations period
from state law. The Court held that this borrowing was not appropriate.
First, the Court concluded that the state borrowing rule was not com-
pelled by the Rules of Decision Act. Because the Act only compelled
application of state law in the absence of federal law, if federal law was
found to furnish an appropriate statute of limitations, the Act would not
apply.2"
Second, the Supreme Court stated that state law does not always fur-
nish an appropriate limitations period, particularly when that period
conflicts with the objectives of the federal statute. As the Court ex-
plained it, "[s]tate legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with
national interests in mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts to as-
sure that the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with
the implementation of national policies."'" Accordingly, the Court held
that if a limitations period "from elsewhere in federal law clearly pro-
vides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal
policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a signif-
icantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking,"' the federal
courts should borrow the federally prescribed period rather than looking
to state law.
The Court continued the approach adopted in DelCostello in Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.23 Agency Holding con-
cerned a civil claim under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Statute24 ("RICO"). Although RICO contains an express
state in which they sat mandated the application of the forum state's law or required use
of a borrowing statute.
18. Cf Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1990) ("With
a unanimity unmatched in any other corner of securities law, everyone wants a simpler
way-and to everyone that means a uniform federal statute of limitations."), cert. denied,
111 S. CL 2887 (1991).
19. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
20. See id. at 159 n.13.
21. Id. at 161 (quoting Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977)).
22. Id. at 171-72.
23. 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988).
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private right of action, it does not provide a statute of limitations. The
prior practice under RICO, as under Rule lOb-5, had been to borrow a
statute of limitations from state law.2" In Agency Holding, the trial court
had determined that the plaintiff's claim was time barred under Penn-
sylvania's statute of limitations for fraud claims.26 The Third Circuit
reversed, finding that, although Pennsylvania law furnished the appropri-
ate source of a limitations period for RICO claims, the more appropriate
period was that of the longer Pennsylvania residual statute of
limitations.27
The Supreme Court held that, as in DelCostello, state law did not pro-
vide an appropriate limitations period because the state law sources were
not sufficiently analogous to the type of federal claim provided under
RICO.28 Moreover, the interstate nature of racketeering militated in
favor of a uniform federal limitations period. In looking for a federal
borrowing source, the Court noted that RICO had been modeled, in
large part, on the Clayton Antitrust Act.2 9 Accordingly, the Court con-
cluded that the objectives of the RICO statutory scheme would best be
served by applying the four year limitations period of the Clayton Act.30
The DelCostello and Agency Holding decisions, coupled with the pre-
existing inconsistency among the circuits with respect to the appropriate
state source for borrowing a limitations period, led several courts to re-
consider the validity of their borrowing practices with respect to lOb-5
claims. In In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation,3 the Third
Circuit, sitting en banc, was asked to decide whether lOb-5 claims in
New Jersey should be governed by New Jersey's six year limitations pe-
riod for common law fraud or the two year period provided by New
Jersey blue sky laws.32
Rejecting both these options, the court determined that state law did
not properly address the regulatory objectives of the federal securities
laws.33 In the court's view, Congress had expressly rejected the approach
of both common law fraud and the state blue sky laws when, in 1934, it
adopted the Securities Exchange Act.34 Moreover, the nature of securi-
ties fraud litigation required, according to the court, a uniform federal
limitations period.35 The court also noted that most federal securities
25. See Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 149.
26. See id. at 146.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 150.
29. See id. at 150-51 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 15).
30. See id. at 156.
31. 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988).
32. See id. at 1538. The district court certified the question to the Third Circuit pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which permits certification for appellate review of a "con-
trolling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion."
Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1551 n.1 (Seitz, J., dissenting).
33. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1547-49.
34. See id. at 1548-49.
35. See id. at 1549.
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claims were already subject to a uniform statute of limitations: a one-
and-three year limitations period.36 Accordingly, the court adopted this
period for lOb-5 claims. Under the Data Access approach, a lOb-5 claim
was timely if it was filed within "one year after the plaintiff discovers the
facts constituting the violation, and in no event more than three years
after such violation. 37
In Short v. Belleville Shoe Manufacturing Co.,38 the Seventh Circuit
also chose to use a uniform federal limitations period for securities fraud
claims. Seizing upon the holdings in Agency Holding and DelCostello
that the Rules of Decision Act does not require federal courts to borrow
limitations periods from state law, Judge Easterbrook's opinion con-
cluded that "[t]hese cases call for fresh examination of the question
whether to turn to state law in securities cases."39 Citing numerous pol-
icy justifications, including the interstate nature of federal securities
fraud, the impracticalities of inconsistent rules in different circuits, the
opportunities for forum-shopping, and the abundant federal limitations
periods available in other sections of the federal securities laws, the Sev-
enth Circuit overturned its previous rule and held that "federal and not
state law supplies the statute of limitations in suits under § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5."'  The Short court then examined federal law and con-
cluded that the most closely analogous federal limitations period was the
one-and-three year period contained in section 13 of the Securities Act of
1933.41 Accordingly, the court applied that period to bar the plaintiff's
claims.42
The Second Circuit followed these examples in Ceres Partners v. Gel
Associates.43 In Ceres Partners, the court acknowledged that its state law
borrowing practices would, under the facts of this case, require it to bor-
row from the Third Circuit, which had adopted a one-and-three year
36. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1548-49. This was the period applicable to claims
under §§ 9(e), 18(c), and 29(b) of the 1934 Act.
37. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1550.
38. 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990).
39. Id at 1388. The Seventh Circuit had decided, in Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329,
1332-33 (7th Cir.), cem denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987), that the federal statute of limitations
found in § 13 of the Securities Act provided a closer fit for lob-5 claims than state law
but declined to adopt the federal statute in place of state borrowing, reasoning that it was
"too late for an inferior federal court to turn back the clock" Id. at 1333. One month
later, the Supreme Court decided Agency Holding.
40. Short, 908 F.2d at 1389.
41. See id at 1390-92. Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides an express
limitations period for claims involving misrepresentation and fraud in connection with
the sale of securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988). This period operates in a similar
fashion to the statute of limitations adopted in Data Access. See Short, 908 F.2d at 1390-
92.
42. See Short, 908 F.2d at 1390-92. The Seventh Circuit also rejected the argument
that the doctrine of equitable tolling could be used to extend plaintiffs time to sue beyond
the three year period of repose, citing both the structure of the statutory provision and
the policy of setting an outer limit on securities fraud claims. See id. at 1391-92.
43. 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990).
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limitations period.44 Both parties, however, pressed the court to adopt a
uniform federal rule.45 After considering both the practical problems of
state borrowing and the legislative purpose of federal regulation, the
court agreed that a federal limitations period was appropriate and held
that the most closely analogous period was the one-and-three year period
provided in sections 9(e) and 18(a) of the Exchange Act.4
The decisions in Data Access, Short, and Ceres Partners to adopt a uni-
form federal statute of limitations created a conflict among the circuits.
Although three circuits adopted uniform limitations periods, the other
circuits refused to follow their example and reaffirmed their intentions to
look to state law.47 It is not clear, however, that this reflected a deep or
permanent split among the circuits. The disagreement between courts
can better be described as the middle stage of an evolutionary process.
Both in the circuits that followed the reasoning in Data Access and in
those that did not, there were indications that the progression of
Supreme Court48 and circuit cases addressing the subject was causing
44. See id. at 352-53. The Second Circuit borrowing rule required the court to look
to the choice of law rules of New York CPLR § 202, which directed application of the
laws of the state where the action accrued. In § 10(b) cases, this had been construed by
courts in the Second Circuit to mean the state where the "economic impact [of the fraud]
is felt, normally the plaintiff's residence." Ceres Partners, 918 F.2d at 353 (citations omit-
ted). Because Ceres was a citizen of New Jersey, this rule would have resulted in the
application of the statute of limitations used by federal district courts in New Jersey
which meant, at the time of Ceres Partners, following Data Access. See id.
45. See Ceres Partners, 918 F.2d at 352. The plaintiff, joined by the SEC as amicus,
argued that the court should borrow the five year statute of limitations provided by Con-
gress in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d), as amended by the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1. See
Ceres, 918 F.2d at 362-63.
46. See Ceres Partners, 918 F.2d at 364.
47. See Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380, 384-85 (9th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Duff &
Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567, 1569-70 (11th Cir. 1990); Jensen v. Snellings, 841 F.2d 600,
606-07 (5th Cir. 1988). In each of these cases, the courts chose to continue their former
practice of looking to analogous state law for a statute of limitations in Rule lob-5
actions.
48. Part of the problem is that the Supreme Court's instructions have not been clear.
After DelCostello, the Court appeared to retreat from its position favoring federal limita-
tions periods for federal causes of action. In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), the
Court rejected the need for a uniform federal limitations period for private civil rights
actions brought under § 1983 and decided that a single limitations period should be cho-
sen for such actions within each state. See Garcia, 471 U.S. at 275. Similarly, after
Agency Holding, the Court decided Reed v. United Transportation Union, 488 U.S. 319
(1989), in which it borrowed the limitations period for a labor law claim from state law
and reiterated that
the general rule [is] that statutes of limitation are to be borrowed from state law.
We decline to borrow a state statute of limitations only "when a rule from else-
where in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state stat-
utes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation
make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial
lawmaking."
Id. at 324 (quoting DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172
(1983)).
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courts to reevaluate their prior practice of "turning to state periods of
limitations... on auto-pilot. '4 9 For example, the Seventh Circuit had
initially refused to change its practice of borrowing from state law after
the Supreme Court decided DelCostello, but then reconsidered in Short
after the Court had ruled in Agency Holding.5" Similarly, although the
First Circuit rejected a request to adopt a federal limitations period for
securities fraud in a 1987 decision,5" the following year it looked to fed-
eral law for the source of a statute of limitations for a federal labor law
claim and, in the course of that opinion, cited Data Access with ap-
proval.52 Moreover, in at least two of the panel opinions in which circuit
courts had rejected a federal limitations period, the courts indicated their
reluctance to change prior circuit practice in the absence of en banc
consideration.5
Although the Supreme Court initially refused to hear the question,' it
eventually granted certiorari to consider the appropriate statute of limita-
tions for federal securities fraud.55
II. THE LAMPF DECISION
In Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,56 the
Supreme Court addressed the proper statute of limitations for private
claims under Rule I0b-5. After reviewing the recent decisions in which
lower courts had debated the merits of borrowing from state law, the
Court rendered a decision that greatly simplified federal securities fraud
litigation. The Court held that a uniform statute of limitations was ap-
propriate for lOb-5 claims and that the limitations period should be bor-
rowed from a federal source.5
The Court explained that other provisions of the 1934 Act were more
closely analogous to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 than state law. 58 After
considering several statutes of limitations provided by other sections of
the Act, the Court concluded that section 9(e), which applies a one-and-
three year limitations period to suits relating to manipulation of security
49. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1387 (7th Cir. 1990).
50. See id. at 1389 (discussing court's prior reluctance to "jettison [its] existing ap-
proach" in Norris).
51. See Maggio v. Gerard Freezer & Ice Co., 824 F.2d 123, 127-29 (1st Cir. 1987).
52. See Communications Workers of America v. Western Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1137,
1139 (1st Cir. 1988).
53. See Smith v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1990) (settled
circuit practice prevents court from overruling prior cases and adopting Data Access ap-
proach in the absence of an en banc proceeding); Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380, 384
(9th Cir. 1990) (as panel, court bound by prior cases).
54. The court denied certiorari in both Data Access, 488 U.S. 849 (1988), and Short v.
Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991).
55. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilberston, I11 S. Ct. 242
(1990) (granting certiorari).
56. 111 S. CL 2773 (1991).
57. See id. at 2780-82.
58. See i& at 2780-81.
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prices, provided the best fit and should be the source from which the
limitations period for Rule lOb-5 claims is borrowed.5 9 It held that
"[i]itigation instituted pursuant to § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 therefore must
be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constitut-
ing the violation and within three years after such violation."'
The majority opinion did not explicitly address what became the most
controversial aspect of the Lampf decision: the question of whether to
apply the uniform federal statute of limitations retroactively to pending
private claims brought under Rule lOb-5. Previously, in Chevron Oil Co.
v. Huson,61 the Court had developed a framework for analyzing whether
decisions should apply retroactively and had applied that framework
when it announced a new statute of limitations. Nonetheless, in Lampf,
the issue did not merit even a footnote in the majority opinion. The
Court simply concluded that, in light of the undisputed fact that none of
plaintiffs' claims was filed within three years after petitioner's alleged
misrepresentations, the claims were untimely under the three year statute
of repose.62 It therefore reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.63
Lampf generated four additional opinions." Justices Stevens, in a dis-
senting opinion in which Justice Souter joined, disagreed with the major-
ity's decision to adopt a uniform federal statute of limitations.65
Believing that this approach, while justified on policy grounds, was more
appropriately left to Congress, Justice Stevens argued that the Court
should defer to four decades of established law and continue to borrow
from state law. In a dissent in which Justice O'Connor joined, Justice
Kennedy argued that, although adoption of a uniform federal limitations
period was appropriate, it should not include a three year statute of
repose.66
Justice O'Connor also dissented separately to emphasize her disagree-
ment with the Court's decision to apply its holding to the parties before
59. See id. at 2781.
60. Id. at 2782. The Court also considered whether the limitations period, specifically
the three year statute of repose, was subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling. See id. It
concluded that this doctrine was fundamentally inconsistent with the one-and-three year
limitations structure. See id. The purpose of the three year statute of repose, according
to the Court, was to impose an outside limit on claims. This limit would be eviscerated if
equitable tolling was permitted. See id.
61. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
62. See Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2782.
63. See id. at 2783.
64. In addition to the opinions discussed below, Justice Scalia, who joined in most of
the majority opinion, wrote a separate opinion questioning the methodology of judicially
created limitations periods, particularly for judicially created causes of action. Justice
Scalia described the process of implying a statute of limitations for an implied cause of
action as "too lawless to be imagined" but concluded that when confronted with the
situation, the most responsible approach was to borrow from an analogous federal cause
of action. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
65. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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it.6 "Until today, however," Justice O'Connor wrote, "the Court has
never applied a new limitations period retroactively to the very case in
which it announced the new rule so as to bar an action that was timely
under binding Circuit precedent."6
Justice O'Connor was not alone in questioning the retroactive applica-
tion of the new statute of limitations. Although courts and commenta-
tors praised the adoption of a uniform federal statute of limitations,
many could not quite believe that the Court intended its Lampf holding
to be retroactive. The losing plaintiffs in Lampf felt the issue was suffi-
ciently ambiguous to fie a petition for rehearing on the issue of retroac-
tivity. That petition was denied.69
The Court clarified its intent that the holding in Lampf be applied to
all pending actions under Rule lOb-5 in two other rulings. First, on the
same day that it announced its decision in Lampf, the Court decided
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia.0 In James Beam, the Court
held that the doctrine of selective prospectivity, which the Court had
previously "abandoned in the criminal context,"71 was also inappropriate
in the civil context.72 Although a new civil holding could be applied
retroactively or prospectively,"3 the Court stated that, "when the Court
has applied a rule of law to the litigants in one case it must do so with
respect to all others not barred by procedural requirements or res judi-
cata."' 4 The implication of this holding for Lampf was that, having ap-
plied the federal limitations period to the litigants in that case, the Court
expected the period to be applied retroactively to other pending cases."
67. See id. at 2785 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2786 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
69. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 112 S. Ct. 27 (1991)
(denying petition for rehearing).
70. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
71. Id at 2444-45 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)).
72. See id at 2446. Selective prospectivity involves a court applying its holding to the
litigants in the case before it, but declining to make the holding otherwise retroactive. See
id at 2444.
73. See id at 2447-48. The Court had previously announced a test to determine
whether a new rule of law should be applied retroactively or prospectively in Chevron Oil
Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). The Chevron Oil test required a court to apply its
decision prospectively where its decision involved a new rule of law, where the litigants
may have reasonably relied upon the old rule, and "where prospectivity is on balance
warranted by its effect on the operation of the new rule and by the inequities that might
otherwise result from retroactive application." James Beam, 11 S. Ct. at 2445 (citing
Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-07). In James Beam, the Court seemed to retreat from its
holding in Chevron Oil, stating that retroactivity should be the norm in civil cases based
on principles of equality and fairness. See id. at 2446. The Court refused, however, to
"speculate as to the bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity." Id. at 2448.
74. Id.
75. The Court had anticipated this approach in the criminal area. See Marc M. Ar-
kin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts after Teague v. Lane, 69
N.C. L. Rev. 371, 375-76 (1991) (examining Supreme Court's approach to retroactive
application of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure). An analysis of the retroac-
tivity issue in Lampf is beyond the scope of this Article.
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The Supreme Court gave further evidence of its intention that Lampf
be applied retroactively through its action in Welch v. Cadre Capital76
Welch, which was pending at the time the Court decided Lampf, origi-
nally involved the question of whether the Second Circuit would apply
its holding in Ceres Partners retroactively. Although the Second Circuit
had adopted a federal limitations period in Ceres Partners, it refused to
apply that holding in Welch.71 Instead, the court applied the three-part
analysis of Chevron Oil 8 and concluded that the Ceres Partners holding
would not be applied retroactively, based on the facts of the Welch
case.7 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Welch, vacated the
judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of James
Beam and Lampf.80 Upon remand, the Second Circuit concluded that
Lampf applied retroactively.81 Other circuits have unanimously
agreed. 2
III. THE RESPONSE AND REACTION TO LA MPF
The immediate response to Lampf was one of shock and dismay."'
Because many of the previously applicable state statutes of limitations
either were longer or did not contain a statute of repose, and because
courts had also been using equitable tolling principles to delay the run-
ning of limitations periods, the retroactive application of Lampf meant
that a number of lawsuits that were timely when filed were now time-
barred. 4 Lower courts were virtually unanimous in concluding that the
combination of the decisions in Lampf and James Beam required such
suits to be dismissed.85
76. 923 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nom. Northwest Say. Bank v. Welch, 111 S,
Ct. 2882 (1991).
77. See id. at 990-91.
78. See id. at 993-95. For a discussion of Chevron Oil, see supra note 73.
79. See id. at 994-95.
80. See Northwest Say. Bank v. Welch, 111 S. Ct. 2882 (1991).
81. See Welch v. Cadre Capital, 946 F.2d 185, 188 (2d Cir. 1991).
82. See Lufkin v. McCallum, 956 F.2d 1104, 1108 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
326 (1992); Howard v. Haddad, 962 F.2d 328, 330 (4th Cir. 1992); Boudreau v. Deloitte,
Haskins & Sells, 942 F.2d 497, 498 (8th Cir. 1991).
83. This reaction was based primarily on the fact that Lampf shortened the limita-
tions period in many jurisdictions, rejected equitable tolling principles, and applied retro-
actively to allow dismissal of pending cases. In contrast, the Court's adoption of a
uniform federal limitations period was a long-awaited development that was generally
well-received. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1990 Term: Leading Cases, 105 Harv. L.
Rev. 177, 400 (1991) ("Lampf brings a welcome end to the uncertainty and disparity
among jurisdictions in setting limits to lob-5 actions.").
84. See, e.g., 137 Cong. Rec. S18,624 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Bryan) ("Lampf changed the rules in the middle of the game for thousands of fraud
victims who already had suits pending-applying a shorter statute of limitations than
when they brought their suits."); Barbara Roper, Stop the Clock on Swindlers, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 19, 1991, reprinted in 137 Cong. Rec. at S18,624 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991)
(criticizing Lampf's shorter limitations period and retroactive application).
85. See generally Johnson, supra note 12, at 610 n.6 (describing effect of Lampf deci-
sion on pending cases and observing that "numerous pending cases" were dismissed).
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To many litigants and a number of congressional representatives, these
dismissals were unfair. This concern was exacerbated by the prevailing
political climate. Lampf was decided during a period in which public
opinion of the securities markets was at virtually an all-time low. Several
scandals had recently rocked the country, including Ivan Boesky's in-
sider trading, the fraud at many savings and loan institutions, the BCCI
fraud, and the disclosure of corruption in the junk bond market that led
to the prosecution of MichaelMilken. Many observers viewed the effect
of the Lampf-generated dismissals as permitting the wrongdoers behind
these frauds to escape responsibility for their actions. 6
Congress immediately began considering a number of bills designed to
overturn Lampf. Senator Bryan introduced one of the first, the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1991.87 The Bryan bill proposed amending
the Exchange Act to require claims for securities fraud to be brought
within the latter of two years from the date of discovery of the fraud or
five years from the date of the fraud."8 Congressman Markey introduced
a similar bill in the House, the Securities Investors Legal Rights Act of
1991.89 The Markey bill would have provided that a securities fraud suit
was timely if filed within five years of the transaction or three years from
when the fraud was discovered or should have been discovered, 9° which-
ever came later.91
The proposed legislation was controversial. 92 In legislative hearings,
many testified in support of extending the statute of limitations. One
proponent of a longer limitations period was Chairman Breeden of the
SEC, who stated that the Lampf limitations period was "unrealistically
short."93 As support for this view, Chairman Breeden testified about the
86. See, eg., 137 Cong. Rec. Hi1,812, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991)
(statement of Congressman Markey):
In that one action, the case of Lampf versus Gilbertson, the Supreme Court
signed over a multibillion dollar check to Michael Milken, Charles Keating,
and a coalition of special interests which produced the financial wreckage of the
1980's[ ] [a]nd threatened as well the recovery of billions of taxpayer dollars in
S&L and bank failures attributable to securities fraud.
87. See S. 1533, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Bryan bill].
88. The bill would also have eliminated the retroactive effect of the Lampf decision
and allowed pending suits to proceed under the new limitations period. See id.
89. See H.R. 3185, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Markey bill].
90. See icL § 2(a). The three years would run from "the date on which the violation
was discovered or should have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence." Id.
91. The Markey bill also provided for the reinstatement of claims that had been dis-
missed as time barred under Lampf if they would have been timely under the statute of
limitations applicable in that jurisdiction prior to the Lampf decision or if they were
timely under the new statute of limitations provided by the bill. See id.
92. See SEC Reiterates Support for Extending Limitations Period for Private Lah.uits,
23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1433 (Oct. 4, 1991) (describing both support and opposi-
tion for legislation and quoting prepared statement by Subcommittee Chairman Christo-
pher Dodd (D-Conn) noting "that a coalition representing 'a broad spectrum of
American business' has formed in opposition to the Bryan bill").
93. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1991: Hearing on S 1533 Before the Sub-
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importance of private securities fraud suits in the enforcement of the fed-
eral securities laws and observed that the Senate's two-and-five year pe-
riod balanced the societal interests in prompt filings and finality of
transactions against the door-closing effect of a limitations period.94
But there were signs that the Administration, which had indicated
concern about excessive private securities litigation, did not concur with
the Chairman's position.95 Extending the statute of limitations would
expand further an already problematically expansive area of litigation.
Many in the securities industry had long been critical of the proliferation
of strike suits, noting that most private securities fraud suits yield settle-
ments in which the primary beneficiaries are the plaintiffs' attorneys.96
Critics also warned that securities fraud lawsuits were crippling industry
and innovation in order to benefit stock speculators and attorneys. 97
The ultimate resolution was a political compromise9" spurred by the
fact that many in Congress believed a quick solution was urgently neces-
sary to address the retroactive effect of Lampf on pending cases before
the rapidly-approaching end of the Fall 1991 term. 99 The broad ques-
tions about whether it was appropriate to extend the statute of limita-
tions for Rule 10b-5 claims, coupled with the Administration's resistance
to such an extension in the absence of other litigation reforms, made it
unlikely that Congress could resolve these issues in time. Accordingly,
Congress decided, in November 1991, to tack a provision reversing the
retroactive effect of Lampf onto the omnibus federal banking bill."°° The
bill, including this provision, was signed by President Bush on December
19, 1991.10
The provision, as enacted, did not provide a general statute of limita-
comm. on Securities of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 13 (1991) (prepared testimony of Chairman Breeden).
94. See id. at 14-15.
95. See, eg., White House Says Lampf Proposal Must be Combined with Curbs on
Litigation Abuses, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1643 (1991) (reporting announcement
by the administration that it opposed congressional eff'orts to extend the limitations pe-
riod for private civil securities fraud suits unless Congress also enacted measures to curb
meritless litigation).
96. See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
97. See 137 Cong. Rec. S17,356-57 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Domenici) (arguing against extending limitations period for securities fraud without ad-
dressing "the growing number of meritless 10(5) [sic] cases that are making it harder and
harder for U.S. companies to focus on developing better products and competing interna-
tionally"); see also SEC Reiterates Support for Extending Limitations Period for Private
Lawsuits, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1433 (1991) (describing testimony urging Con-
gress not to consider the statute of limitations question in isolation but to view it in the
context of broader securities fraud litigation reform).
98. See 137 Cong. Rec. H1l,811 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (prepared statement of
Rep. Dingell) (describing S. 543 as including a "compromise" to reverse the retroactive
application of Lampt).
99. See id. (describing reversal of retroactive aspect of Lampf as "urgently needed").
100. Section 476 of S. 543, the omnibus banking reform bill, amended the 1934 Act by
adding a new section, § 27A. The text of § 27A appears in note 102, infra.
101. The statute of limitations provision was enacted as § 476 of the Federal Deposit
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tions for Rule lOb-5 claims. Instead, the statute amended the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by adding a narrowly tailored provision, section
27A, addressed solely to the application of Lampf to pending cases.102
Briefly, section 27A provided that (1) claims filed prior to the date of the
Lampf decision which were timely under the laws of the applicable juris-
diction, including principles of retroactivity, 10 3 were to be considered
timely filed, and (2) claims that had been dismissed based on Lampf
could be reinstated within sixty days upon plaintiff's motion."°
IV. THE LEGITIMACY OF SECTION 27A
A. The Application of the Statute
The adage "haste makes waste" seems aptly applied to section 27A.
The enactment and application of this provision have already spilled an
enormous quantity of judicial ink, as shell-shocked litigants and courts
have attempted to assess both the legitimacy of the statute and its impact
on pending cases---cases that are rapidly taking on an otherworldly aura
as they are killed and revived by turns. Before examining the legitimacy
of section 27A, however, a preliminary question is in order: What pre-
cisely did Congress do in adopting this statutory amendment?
As written, section 27A directs courts to determine whether a case
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236,
2387 (1991) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (Supp. III 1991)).
102. Section 27A of the 1934 Act reads as follows:
(a) Effect on pending causes of action
The limitation period for any private civil action implied under section 78j(b)
of this title that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be the limita-
tion period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including princi-
ples of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991.
(b) Effect on dismissed causes of action
Any private civil action implied under section 78j(b) of this Title that was
commenced on or before June 19, 1991-
(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, and
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period pro-
vided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of ret-
roactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991,
shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after De-
cember 19, 1991.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (Supp. III 1991).
103. This part of the statute appears addressed to those circuits that had adopted the
one-and three-year limitations period but that had not yet determined whether to apply
that period retroactively. See e.g., Ceres Partners v. Gel Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 364 (2d
Cir. 1990) (leaving "for the future all questions concerning retroactive application").
Following James Beam, these courts began to apply the new limitations period retroac-
tively. See Welch v. Cadre Capital, 946 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1991). By addressing § 27A to
the retroactivity issue as well as to the underlying limitations period, Congress seemed to
be precluding the application of James Beam to these pending cases, as well as Lampf.
See Walsehe v. First Investors Corp., 961 F.2d 649, 652 (2d Cir. 1992) (describing effect
of § 27A as directing courts back to the case-specific retroactivity analysis of Chevron). A
detailed discussion of the retroactivity issues raised by James Beam and § 27A is beyond
the scope of this Article.
104. See Walsche, 961 F.2d at 652.
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filed prior to June 19, 1991, was timely by applying the law as it existed
as of that date, including principles of retroactivity. The statute does not
explain, however, the manner in which a court is to choose what the
limitations period was on June 19, 1991. Presumably, Congress intended
courts to apply whatever rule had been used to determine the statute of
limitations in the most recent circuit or district court case preceding
Lampf.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrated, however, the status of limi-
tations periods for lOb-5 claims prior to the Lampf decision was far from
clear. The rules varied from circuit to circuit and even within circuits
and were repeatedly subject to modification depending on the evolution
of federal law, changes in the interpretation of state borrowing rules, and
even changes to the underlying state limitations periods.0 5 In the ab-
sence of explicit congressional guidance, courts were acting in a quasi-
legislative capacity in applying these rules; that is, they were developing
federal common law.
What then was the true effect of the Supreme Court's decision in
Lamp? There are various legal theories that describe the process by
which courts develop the common law. Under the so-called declaratory
theory, a court simply finds or declares "the rule that had always existed
yet remained hidden from view." 106 According to this theory, the Lampf
Court did not make new law on June 20th, but instead simply found or
declared existing law. 107 If Lampf merely declared the law, however,
rather than causing a rule to spring into being on June 20, 1991, what
does it mean for Congress to turn the clock back to June 19th? Did the
preexisting but undiscovered law not exist on that date as well? 08
The common law tradition has been particularly important in the de-
velopment of private federal securities fraud claims. Although private
Rule lOb-5 claims have a nominal statutory basis, the judiciary has been
the exclusive author of the private cause of action. This process of law-
making is fundamentally different from the ordinary legislative process.
Among other distinctions, judicial lawmaking is evolutionary rather than
revolutionary; a legal rule develops and gains general acceptance over
time. During the course of this development, it may be impossible to
specify precisely what the governing rule is.
105. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
106. In re Brichard Secs. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1108 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
107. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, Ill S. Ct. 2439, 2451 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment) (judges in the common law tradition make law "as
though they were 'finding it'--disceming what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is
today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be"); see also TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F.
Supp. 587, 592 (E.D. La. 1992) ("The limitations period 'found' in Lampf thus did not
represent a change in the law, but rather, a mere clarification [of] what the law has always
been. Courts such as the Fifth Circuit, which had previously applied other limitations
periods to section 10(b) claims, had thus done so in error.").
108. Presumably the rule existed prior to that date; otherwise the lower courts that
anticipated Lampf would have been unable to find it.
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The evolutionary process is complicated by the fact that judicial law-
making does not require action by the United States Supreme Court. A
legal issue can be addressed by lower courts and gain general acceptance
as a "clear rule of law" many years before the Supreme Court recognizes
its validity. 9 Some issues may never be explicitly addressed by the
Court. l10
The law governing the statute of limitations for securities fraud claims
developed in precisely this way. The Supreme Court never expressly en-
dorsed the old rule of borrowing from state law.I To the extent that
Supreme Court precedent establishes a rule of law, the only precedent
squarely addressing the question of statute of limitations is Lampf, which
holds that state borrowing is improper. Nor did the Court, in the years
prior to Lampf, articulate a particular procedure for borrowing by, for
example, explaining the principles to be used in determining which state
statute was most closely analogous to the federal statute at issue. Thus, if
the clear rule in lOb-5 claims was to borrow a limitations period from
state law," 2 that rule was adopted without affirmative Supreme Court
action.
With this in mind, it is difficult to understand why the Supreme Court
action in Lampf is the trigger that changes federal law. Even if borrow-
ing the limitations period for Rule lOb-5 claims became the rule of law
109. This point is illustrated by the development of a private right of action under Rule
lOb-5. Lower court decisions began recognizing such a right as early as 1946. The first
reported decision to recognize a private right of action under Rule lOb-5 was Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court finally
acknowledged the existence of a private right of action 25 years later in Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). Even then, however, the Court
did not analyze the issue but simply concluded that the existence of a claim had been
established. The Court reasoned as follows: "[ilt is now established that a private right
of action is implied under § 10(b)." Id. at 13 n.9. Subsequent decisions by both the
Supreme Court and lower courts continued to recognize the existence of the right. At
what point, then, did it become "the law of the land" that a private right of action existed
under Rule l0b-5? Indeed the argument was still being made in 1983, almost 40 years
after Kardon, that the courts had exceeded their authority in implying a private right of
action under rule lOb-5. See eg., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 495 U.S. 375, 379-
87 (1983) (considering whether Rule lOb-5 provided an implied private right of action for
conduct subject to an express civil remedy under the 1933 Act).
110. For example, lower courts have uniformly interpreted recklessness as sufficient to
meet the scienter requirement of Rule 10b-5, but the Supreme Court has not addressed
the issue. See Richard W. Jennings, Harold Marsh, Jr. & John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities
Regulation Cases and Materials 898 (7th ed. 1992) (stating that the Supreme Court has
"left open" this question, but circuit courts have "unanimously adopted the view" that
recklessness is sufficient).
111. See Ceres Partners v. Gel Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 355 (2d Cir. 1990) ("While the
Supreme Court has noted the prevailing practice of borrowing state law for limitations
periods for federal securities law claims, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
210 n.29 (1976); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384 n.18 (1983), it
has not explicitly approved the practice .... .") (parallel citations omitted).
112. Cf Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773,
2785 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that adopting a federal limitations period for
lOb-5 claims worked a "change in a rule of law").
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sometime during the forty years prior to Lampf, it would seem that the
law began to change through the combination of Supreme Court deci-
sions questioning the borrowing doctrine and lower court cases applying
the new rules to lOb-5. If this is properly viewed as an evolutionary
process, the Lampf decision represents only one step in that process.' 3
All of this suggests that congressional intent in adopting section 27A
extended beyond reversing Lampf By directing courts to apply the law
as it existed on June 19, 1991, Congress attempted not to change the law,
but to freeze it for a particular class of cases. In other words, Congress is
instructing the courts to ignore not just Lampf, but also Agency Hold-
ing,114 DelCostello,11 5 Data Access,"1 6 Short," 7 and all the cases casting
doubt upon the continued vitality of state borrowing doctrine. Instead of
selecting a rule of law for a lOb-5 statute of limitations, Congress is for-
bidding the application of a particular rule of law, that of a federal limi-
tations period, in circuits that had not anticipated Lampf. 18 This
analysis raises another important question: Does Congress have the
power to legislate in this manner?
B. The Constitutional Questions
The unusual nature of Congress' action in enacting section 27A imme-
diately rendered the statute subject to challenge. Defendants who had
lost the benefit of the Lampf limitations period through section 27A chal-
lenged the provision as unconstitutional" 19 under various theories includ-
ing separation of powers, equal protection, 20 and interference with
113. It is not even clear that the Lampfdecision was necessary to change the rule to
that of a federal limitations period. The Supreme Court, after all, had declined to review
the decisions in both Short and Data Access, even though both adopted the "new law" of
borrowing a limitations period from federal law. In the absence of Supreme Court re-
view, it is likely that the movement toward a uniform federal rule would have continued,
with other circuits reconsidering their procedures through en banc proceedings or other
means.
114. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
115. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
116. In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988).
117. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 2887 (1991).
118. See Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1992)
(holding that § 27A prevented it from determining, on the basis of all the available law on
June 19, 1991, that the one-and-three year rule of Lampf was the law in the Eleventh
Circuit as of that date).
119. Dozens of district court decisions have evaluated the constitutionality of § 27A.
Although the courts are split, the majority have upheld the statute against challenge. To
date, only two circuit courts have addressed the issue, and both have found the statute
constitutional. See Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1547 (10th
Cir. 1992); Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1573.
120. See Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1571, 1574. The Equal Protection Clause requires
that similarly situated parties be treated the same under the law. Although defendants in
securities fraud cases are not a suspect class, the legislature must have a rational basis for
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defendants' vested rights in a final judgment.1 21 The remainder of this
discussion will focus on the separation of powers question, the theory
that has been the most widely raised basis for challenging section 27A. 1'
The separation of powers argument focuses on the constitutional dis-
tinction between the role of Congress in adopting rules of law and the
role of the courts in deciding cases in which an existing rule of law is
interpreted and applied. In United States v. Klein, 123 the Supreme Court
held that a statute directing it to make a factual finding in a particular
case was unconstitutional. 24 The Court found that the statute "inadver-
tently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial
power" '2 by "prescrib[ing] a rule for the decision of a case in a certain
way"' 26 where "no new circumstances [had] been created by [the] legisla-
tion."1 27 The Klein doctrine provides that, although Congress can
change both substantive and procedural law, it cannot prescribe a rule of
decision in a case; that is, Congress cannot tell courts how to apply ex-
isting legal rules.
Because Klein was decided more than a century ago, and because few
cases have involved application of the Klein doctrine, it is difficult to
draw a bright line separating the legislative from the judicial power. In
other words, precisely when is Congress attempting to determine the re-
sult in a litigation as opposed to prescribing a new rule of law? Through
its decision in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society,'28 the Supreme
Court recently furnished some guidance. Seattle Audubon involved an
applying a different rule of law to similarly situated defendants. This Article will not
examine the equal protection challenge to § 27A.
121. Possibly the most troubling aspect of § 27A is subsection (b), which revives cases
dismissed on the basis of Lampf. In McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102 (1898), the
Supreme Court held that the legislature lacks the power to take away rights that have
been vested by final judgment. The Court based this conclusion both on principles of
separation of powers and on the rationale that a final judgment is a form of property that
cannot be taken away without due process. See id. at 123-24. Because subsection (b)
allows cases to be reinstated upon motion of the plaintiff, whether or not a final judgment
of dismissal has been entered and the time for appeal passed, it interferes with the defend-
ant's vested rights in the final judgment. See, eg., Treiber v. Katz, Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCI-) 97,203 (E.D. Mich. June 5, 1992) (upholding § 27A under Klein doctrine, but
finding statute unconstitutional to the extent that it seeks to reinstate claims that have
already been subject to final adjudication).
122. For cases holding that § 27A violates separation of powers, see Johnston v.
CIGNA Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098, 1098 (D. Colo. 1992); TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F.
Supp. 587, 591 (E.D. La. 1992); In re Brichard Securities Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1103
(N.D. Cal. 1992).
123. 80 U.S. 128 (1872).
124. See id at 147-48. Klein involved a statute that directed courts to treat the fact
that individuals had accepted presidential pardons as conclusive proof of their disloyalty
for purposes of claims for compensation for property abandoned to federal troops during
the Civil War. See id at 142-43. Upon proof of the pardons, the courts were to dismiss
summarily for want of jurisdiction. See id at 143-44.
125. Id at 147.
126. Id at 146.
127. Id at 147.
128. 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
1993] $119
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
attack, under the Klein doctrine, on a statute regulating timber harvest-
ing in Washington state. 129 The Ninth Circuit had concluded that the
statute violated the principles inherent in Klein. 30 It held that although
Congress could affect pending litigation, even deliberately, by amending
or repealing a law, it could not dictate the outcome of a litigation where
" 'no new circumstances have been created by legislation.' ""3 The
Ninth Circuit then interpreted the new statute as directing the court to
reach a specific result rather than as establishing new law. Accordingly,
it held that the statute violated Klein.132
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court did not abandon the Klein
doctrine but explained that the doctrine did not apply because the statute
at issue in Seattle Audubon had in fact changed the underlying law."' 3
The Court interpreted the statute differently from the Ninth Circuit and
found that it indirectly amended the environmental statutes in the pend-
ing litigation by providing alternative statutory criteria under which tim-
ber harvesting was legal.' 34  This was, according to the Court, the
equivalent of amending the original statute, something that Congress
clearly had the authority to do.135 Moreover, Congress was not directing
the outcome of a litigation because it still remained for the court to de-
cide whether the timber harvesting satisfied the criteria of the new legis-
lation.136  Accordingly, the Court concluded that Congress had
"compelled changes in law, not findings or results under old law."'13 7
By using the Klein criteria to evaluate the legality of the statute at
issue in Seattle Audubon, the Supreme Court signalled that the Klein
doctrine was still valid. 3 Courts evaluating the validity of section 27A
under the Klein doctrine have therefore asked whether section 27A
changes the law of Rule lOb-5 statute of limitations.13 9 Presumably,
129. See id. at 1410-12. The statute in Seattle Audubon was passed during pending
environmental litigation regarding the harvesting of timber in Washington. See id. at
1410. The statute changed the criteria under which timber harvesting was legal not by
amending the environmental law under which the litigation was pending, but by adding
new methods of complying with the old statute. See id. at 1410-11. The statute also
expressly referred to the pending litigation by caption and docket number and indicated
that adherence to the statute's new criteria would be sufficient to satisfy the statutory
requirements that were the basis of the litigation. See id. at 1411.
130. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1990).
131. Id. (quoting United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871)).
132. See id. at 1317.
133. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1413-14 (1992).
134. See id.
135. See id. at 1414.
136. See id. at 1413-14.
137. Id. at 1413.
138. The Supreme Court also indicated the continued vitality of the Klein doctrine in
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). Again the Court did not
invalidate the statute in question but claimed that its holding was "consistent with the
principles articulated in Klein." Id. at 402.
139. The question is whether Congress is changing the law or attempting to overturn a
judicial interpretation of an unchanged law. For a recent case in which the court consid-
ered this question, see Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Colo. 1992).
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Congress had the authority to adopt a statute of limitations different
from that adopted by the Supreme Court in Lampf, and adoption of a
new statute of limitations would constitute the necessary change of law
to satisfy Klein."4
Section 27A does not, however, change the statute of limitations appli-
cable to lOb-5 cases. Indeed, by enacting section 27A instead of the
broader provisions that had been considered, Congress accepted the
Lampf limitations period for all cases except those subject to section
27A. Congress therefore did not reverse Lampf by statute; it simply re-
versed the retroactive application of Lampf.
Many courts have concluded that section 27A nonetheless changes the
applicable law."' These courts have reasoned that Congress simply
changed the statute of limitations, and hence the applicable law, for a
small class of cases: those filed in a timely manner prior to Lampf.
Thus, for example, the Tenth Circuit in Anixter v. Home-Stake Produc-
tion Co., 42 explained that "in Section 27A, Congress prescribed a new
statute of limitations for the judiciary to apply to all Section 10(b) litiga-
tion pending on June 19, 1991."''
The problem with this analysis is that Congress did not change the law
even for this narrow class of cases. Congress did not, as the Anixter
court states, prescribe a new statute of limitations at all. Congress simply
rejected the retroactive application of Lampf to pending cases and, in so
doing, returned the courts to their conflicting and confusing variety of
pre-Lampf limitations periods.
It can be argued that section 27A is an example of a negative rather
than an affirmative method of adopting a law. In other words, Congress'
action in enacting section 27A can be described as the adoption of a new
rule of law that is not a specific limitations period, but rather a rejection
of the Lampf limitations period. Thus Congress, for the class of cases
specified by section 27A, has adopted the rule of "not-Lampf."
Again, however, this mischaracterizes the nature of the statute. Sec-
tion 27A does not simply reverse Lampf; it "turns back the legal clock to
the period just prior to Lampf."'" Such a congressional action might be
valid if the statute then allowed the courts "independently to adjudicate
140. The general issue of whether the judiciary or the legislature has the power to
impose changes in the law retroactively is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discus-
sion of this issue, see James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, I ll S. Ct. 2439, 2448
(1991). This Article will not address the hoary issues posed if Congress passed a new
statute of limitations and applied it retroactively to pending cases.
141. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First Republicbank Corp., 806 F. Supp. 108
(N.D. Tex. 1992) (citing cases).
142. 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992).
143. Id at 1545; see also Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1573
(11th Cir. 1992) (concluding that § 27A "amends the Securities Exchange Act to provide
the statute of limitations for private causes of action under section 10(b) that were filed by
June 19, 1991").
144. Adler v. Berg Harmon Assocs., 790 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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any reopened actions on the basis of the law as they determine it then
existed." '145 Instead, however, the statute orders the judicial clock
stopped as of June 19, 1991, preventing the courts from carrying out
their judicial function of determining the appropriate statute of limita-
tions in favor of wooden application of the pre-Lampf rules. Thus in
Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,1 46 defendant Scientific-Atlanta
asked the court to adopt a one-and-three year limitations period, consis-
tent with Lampf, based on the existing law on June 19, 1991.147 The
court refused, stating that such action was foreclosed by section 27A.148
Even if section 27A simply reversed Lampf, it would appear to violate
separation of powers principles. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he
essential purpose of the separation of powers is to allow for independent
functioning of each coequal branch of government within its assigned
sphere of responsibility, free from risk of control, interference, or intimi-
dation by other branches." 49 It is difficult to see how the Supreme
Court could function as a coequal branch with Congress if Congress
could simply, by statute, declare that "the decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Lampf v. Gilbertson is hereby reversed." ' With respect to
cases filed prior to June 19, 1991, that is the effect of section 27A.15 ,
145. Id.
146. 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992).
147. See id. at 1571 (citing Appellee's Brief at 16). The defendant argued that
"'[n]othing in Section [27A] precludes this Court from determining what the appropriate
limitations period was for Section 10(b) in light of all the law that existed on June 19 and
applying that law to plaintiffs.'" Id.
148. See id. It is as if Congress has said to the courts: "You have been deciding cases
in which you develop the law of federal securities fraud under section 10(b) for the last 50
years. With respect to the issue of statute of limitations, you are prohibited from continu-
ing that development within the statutorily-designated set of cases."
149. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 760-61 (1982) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (cita-
tions omitted).
150. See 137 Cong. Rec. H11,812-13 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Mar-
key) ("The language contained in [§ 27A] will directly reverse an egregious Supreme
Court decision .... ).
With respect to the litigants in Lampf, this is exactly what § 27A did. After litigating
the statute of limitations issue before the Supreme Court and winning, and after success-
fully persuading the Supreme Court to apply its decision retroactively to dismiss the
claims against them, the Lampf defendants then had those claims reinstated against them
pursuant to § 27A. See Gilbertson v. Leasing Consultants Assocs., No. 8601369-RE (D.
Or. Feb. 6, 1992). Thus, with respect to these litigants, Congress acted as a "Super-
Supreme Court." Ironically, it is not clear that Congress intended this result. See 137
Cong. Rec. S17,382-83 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991) (inquiry by Sen. Garn expressing his
understanding that the bill was not intended to affect the parties in the Lampf decision
itself, and statement by Sen. Riegle confirming correctness of that understanding). But
see 137 Cong. Rec. HI1,812-13 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey)
(stating that the statute would "apply directly to the case and parties of Lampf versus
Gilbertson itself").
151. Alternatively, the statute can be read as changing the Lampf holding from retro-
active to prospective. It does not seem as if such legislation constitutes the adoption of
new law. See TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F. Supp. 587, 592-94 (E.D. La. 1992) (holding
that retroactive application of Lampf is constitutionally compelled, based on Court's
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V. THE FUTURE OF THE RULE lOb-5 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Whatever the answer to the foregoing constitutional debate, section
27A has raised a host of questions.' 52 Significantly, it is probably not the
last congressional word on Rule lOb-5 statute of limitations. Several
members of Congress have already expressed their intention to propose
legislation lengthening the statute of limitations for securities fraud
claims.1 13 In evaluating whether further legislation is desirable, several
factors are worth further consideration.
First, in discussing the Lampf decision and limitations periods for se-
curities fraud, Congress has given relatively little attention to the ration-
ale behind limitations periods in general. Statutes of limitations serve a
number of objectives in our litigation system. They encourage the
prompt resolution of claims while evidence is fresh and witnesses are
available. They protect putative defendants from having to defend
against stale claims and provide repose after a period of time, so that
potential defendants need not conduct their affairs indefinitely under a
cloud of uncertainty. They protect the judicial system from overload by
putting an end to the time when old cases can be brought in favor of
preserving resources for fresher claims." 4
In addition to these general factors, there is a further rationale for stat-
utes of limitations in securities cases: they reduce the ability of a poten-
tial plaintiff to speculate with a securities fraud claim. As Judge
Easterbrook observed in Short: "Prices of securities are volatile. If suit
may be postponed ... then investors may gamble with other people's
money."'55 An investor can sit on a potential claim for years, waiting to
see if the price of the securities involved goes up. If the price goes up, the
investor sells. If the price goes down, the investor sues.
This possibility was precisely what caused Congress to adopt relatively
holding in James Beam); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First Republicbank Corp., 806 F.
Supp. 108 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (same).
152. In addition, the decision and statute continue to raise questions of interpretation.
For example, Lampf holds that the three year period of repose is not subject to principles
of equitable estoppel or tolling. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbert-
son, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2782 (1991). Prior to Lampf, however, most courts had applied
equitable estoppel to toll the borrowed statute of limitations. This equitable tolling doc-
trine appeared, for purposes of Rule lOb-5 actions, to be a matter of federal rather than
state law. Presumably then, it was not part of the statute of limitations that courts bor-
rowed from state law. Was the tolling doctrine then revived by § 27A, or does that as-
pect of Lampf survive?
153. See S. 3181, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at § 36 (1992) (containing a general statute of
limitations requiring all private rights of action, except as provided elsewhere in the stat-
ute, to be filed not later than two years of when the fraud is discovered or should have
been discovered or five years from the date of the fraud, whichever is earlier).
154. See generally Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1390-92 (7th Cir.
1990) (discussing policies behind statutes of limitations for purpose of determining which
limitations period is most appropriate for Rule lOb-5 claims), cert. denied, III S. Ct.
2887 (1991).
155. Id at 1392.
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short limitations periods 156 for the express private rights of action under
the federal securities laws. 157 Congress recognized that the federal secur-
ities laws were atypical in the possibility they offered for opportunistic
claims158 and drafted the statutes of limitations accordingly.15 9 The cur-
rent Congress should not let a few highly publicized frauds blind it to
this concern.
Further attention should also be devoted to the structure of any pro-
posed statute of limitations. The legislation introduced immediately after
Lampf 1" included the same dual period structure as the statute of limi-
tations adopted in Lampf, but both the House and Senate bills would
have allowed plaintiffs to bring suits within a specified period following
discovery of the fraud, even after the expiration of the longer statutory
window.161 This meant that the discovery provision would permit suits
as timely even if they were filed more than five years after the date of the
fraud, leaving no absolute outside limit or period of repose for securities
fraud claims.
In addition, the proposed statutes described the discovery provision of
the statute of limitations in terms of "reasonable diligence.' 162 That is,
the proposed legislation provided for the discovery provision to run from
the date that the fraud was discovered or should have been discovered
through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Although some statutes of
limitations in the federal securities laws incorporate this approach,' 63 the
limitations period adopted by the Supreme Court in Lampf did not; the
start of the one year time frame was predicated on actual discovery of the
156. See, e.g., 78 Cong. Rec. 8199 (1934) (statement of Sen. Kean) (describing oppor-
tunity of investor to speculate with fraud claim: "[The investor] might say to himself, 'I
have something that I can sue on if these bonds go down. If they go up I will not want to
sue because I will get a profit on them, but should they go down, then I have the option of
suing.' ").
157. See, eg., 78 Cong. Rec. 8198 (1934) (statement of Sen. Fletcher):
[T]he thought was that a man ought not to delay suit more than 1 year after he
discovers the fraud. If he has been injured and finds that he has been injured,
he ought to bring his action within a reasonable time, and we fix that time at I
year.
158. See 78 Cong. Rec. 8594 (1934) (statement of Sen. Logan) ("[A]s time passes
someone reaches the conclusion he has lost money in gambling on the stock market,
because generally that is what it is, and he will go back to find out whether there was
anything omitted in the statement.").
159. See 78 Cong. Rec. 8201 (1934) (statement of Sen. Barkley) ("I think we have to
consider this proposed statute of limitations in a little different light from that in which
we consider ordinary statutes of limitations.").
160. Two major legislative proposals, the Bryan bill and the Markey bill, are discussed
supra in the text accompanying notes 87-94.
161. See Bryan bill, supra note 87, § 36; Markey bill, supra note 89, § 36. Thus both
proposed acts would have allowed suits to be filed within the latter of the two or three
year discovery period or the five year straight limitations period.
162. See Bryan bill, supra note 87, § 36; Markey bill, supra note 89, § 36.
163. See, for example, § 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, which provides for a period
running for "one year after the discovery... or after such discovery should have been
made by the exercise of reasonable diligence. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988).
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fraud." Chairman Breeden warned Congress in his comments on the
proposed legislation that a "reasonable diligence" approach provides less
clarity because of the difficulty in ascertaining whether a plaintiff should
have discovered a fraud earlier than he or she actually did.'6 As Chair-
man Breeden observed, "this requirement would prompt a considerable
amount of needless litigation to resolve subtle shadings of what an inves-
tor could or might have done."' 66
Finally, the debate about statute of limitations is, in part, a microcosm
of the larger debate about the efficacy of securities fraud litigation. Stud-
ies have shown that securities fraud litigation is peculiarly subject to
abuse. For example, a recent study published by Professor Janet Alexan-
der in the Stanford Law Review 67 found that a majority of the securities
fraud class actions studied settled at roughly twenty-five percent of the
amount at stake,16 seemingly without regard to their relative merit. The
study also concluded that the primary beneficiaries in these cases appear
to be lawyers, not individual stockholders.' 69 A study conducted by the
Law and Economics Consulting Group examined 330 cases brought
since 1988 and found similar results. 17 0 Congressional concern over this
situation has prompted several legislative proposals to overhaul the liti-
gation of securities fraud cases, the nature of the cause of action, or
164. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 11l S. Ct. 2773,
2782 (1991). It is not clear that either the Court or Congress has focused on the distinc-
tion between the two standards. See id at 2782 n.9 (acknowledging, as SEC observed,
that terminology of the one- and three-year periods differed slightly in different sections,
and selecting, without analysis, the language of § 9(e) of the 1934 Act, "[t]o the extent
that these distinctions in the future might prove significant...").
165. See Securities Investor Legal Rights, Hearing on H.R. 3185 before the Subcomm.
on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 22-25 (1991) (prepared testimony of Chairman Breeden); Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1991, Hearing on S. 1533 before the Subcomm. on Securities of
the Senate Comm. on Banking; Housing and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 28-30
(1991) (prepared testimony of Chairman Breeden); Letter from Richard C. Breeden to
Senator Pete Domenici dated Aug. 12, 1992, reprinted in 138 Cong. Rec. at S12,603-04
(daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Breeden Letter].
166. Breeden Letter, supra note 165, at S12,604.
167. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497 (1991).
168. See id at 517. The study constructed a sample of lawsuits and determined the
amount at stake by calculating the amount of stock price movement and the number of
shares affected by the lawsuit. See id at 515-17.
169. See id at 574-76. Professor Alexander calculated that plaintiffs' attorneys fees
and expenses averaged over 25% of the recovery in her sampling of settled cases and
estimated that total costs of litigation, involving costs and attorneys fees, "are probably
about equal to the amount distributed to the class." Id. at 573.
170. See Vincent E. O'Brien, The Class Action Shakedown Racket, Wall St. J., Sept. 10,
1991, reprinted in 137 Cong. Rec. at S17,357 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991) (finding that 96%
of securities fraud cases were settled; average attorneys' awards were about SI million in
fees and $250,000 in expenses or 21% of the average settlement amount; settlements
resulted in less than a nickel in compensation for each dollar lost by investors); see also
William Tucker, Shakedown?, Forbes, August 19, 1991, at 98 (securities fraud class ac-
tions become a "kind of tax on American businesses").
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both. '7 If Congress, after fifty years, is finally ready to pay some real
attention to the court-created doctrine of federal securities fraud, it
would be ironic for its efforts to be limited to section 27A.
171. See, eg., 138 Cong. Rec. S12,599 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (introduction by Sen.
Domenici of the Securities Private Enforcement Act of 1992, S. 3181, describing it as a
"bill to establish a filing deadline and to provide certain safeguards to curb frivolous and
other cases not substantially justified which are brought under the Securities and Ex-
change Act's implied private action provisions"); H.R. 417 (introduced by Rep. Tauzin,
Jan. 5, 1993, and described in 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 2 at 43-44 (Jan. 15,
1993)) (proposing to reform securities fraud litigation and to extend the statute of limita-
tions to one and five years); see also Alexander, supra note 167, at 581-96 (discussing
possible changes in litigation system to establish a greater link between the merits and the
outcome in settled cases).
